While various covert Botnets were proposed in the past, they still lack complete anonymization for their servers/botmasters or suffer from slower communications among the botmaster and bots. In this paper, we propose LNBot, a new generation hybrid botnet that covertly communicates over Bitcoin Lightning Network (LN) which was recently introduced for faster Bitcoin transactions without writing on the blockchain. LNBot is a scalable two-layer botnet designed to completely anonymize the identity of the botmaster and its communication with multiple command and control (C&C) servers which maintain their own mini botnets by exploiting the various anonymity features of LN. Specifically, LNBot allows any type of commands to be sent instantly by the botmaster to the C&C servers which are ASCII or Huffman-encoded direct payments and forwarded via the LN payment infrastructure. These commands can then be further relayed to bots recruited by each C&C server. We implemented a proof-of-concept on the actual Bitcoin network and analyzed the delay and cost performance of the proposed approaches.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets are networks of computing devices infected with malicious software that is under the control of an attacker, known as bot herder or botmaster [1] . The owner of the botnet controls the bots (i.e., devices that become part of the botnet) through command and control (C&C) server(s) which can communicate with the bots using a C&C channel and can launch various attacks through these bots, including, but not limited to, denial of service (DoS) attacks, information and identity theft, sending spam messages, and other activities. Naturally, a botmaster's goal is to make it difficult for law enforcement to detect and prevent malicious operations. Therefore, establishing a secure C&C infrastructure and hiding the C&C server plays a key role in the long-lasting operation of botnets. The underlying architecture and features of the C&C communication infrastructure (i.e., the connection between the bots and the C&C server, the number of such servers and the way the botmaster communicates with them) have a direct impact on the robustness, stability and reaction time of a botnet [2] .
Numerous C&C channels have been proposed and discussed in the literature assuming a centralized C&C architecture where all the commands are sent from the C&C to the bots. The first generation of botnets utilized Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels and have appeared in 1990s [3] . However, these botnets were easy to detect and stop as IRC domains could be taken down by legal authorities after some time. In order to evade detection, recent years witnessed more unorthodox botnets whose C&C relied on social-media networks such as Twitter messages [4] and Instagram photos [5] , essentially utilizing covert channels for communication. However, the communication from C&C to bots in these cases suffered from long delays as they heavily relied on the frequency of users' social media use. After 2000, peer-to-peer (P2P) botnets started to appear offering improved resiliency over traditional centralized C&C architectures [6] . In a sense, it enabled the use of redundant C&C servers so that even if some of them were taken down, the others could still continue to function. However, they were prone to attacks, such as Sybil attacks [7] , which could disrupt the operation of the actual C&C servers.
Consequently, existing botnet C&C channels and servers has the issue of remaining hidden and resistant against legal authorities' actions. Such problems motivate the hackers to always explore more promising venues for finding new C&C channels with the ever-increasing number of communication options on the Internet. One of such platform is the environment where cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, is exchanged. As Bitcoin offers some degree of anonymity, exploiting it as a C&C communication channel has already been tried for creating a new botnet [8] , [9] . While these botnets addressed the long transaction validation times, they still announce the commands publicly, where the botnet activity can be traced by any observer with the help of the Bitcoin addresses or nonce values of the transactions. Usage of Bitcoin for a botnet C&C leaves the history of malicious activity on the blockchain forever.
Nonetheless, these issues related to costs, public announcement of commands and leaving traces in the blockchain are already being addressed in a newly developed Bitcoin payment channel network called Lightning Network (LN). The LN concept offers an appealing technical approach for making offline transactions (i.e., "off-chain" transactions which are not announced and thus not recorded on the blockchain) in order to speed up the transaction by eliminating the confirmation time and decreasing fees associated with that transaction. Additionally, users' identities are still kept anonymous.
In this paper, we advocate LN as an ideal C&C infrastructure for botnets with all the aforementioned features (i.e., faster transactions, decreased costs). Specifically, LN offers botmasters numerous advantages over existing techniques:
First, LN provides very high anonymity and transactions on the off-chain channels are not recorded on the blockchain. Thus, a botmaster can covertly communicate with the C&C server(s). Second, the revelation of a server does not reveal other servers, and an observer cannot enumerate the size of the botnet. Most importantly, C&C communication over the LN cannot be censored. Although LN is a fast growing emerging payment network, it only has around 11K nodes which may not be ideal for large-scale botnets. Therefore, we propose to use LN as an infrastructure to maintain a network of C&C servers each of which can run its own botnet. Use of multiple C&C servers have been around for a while [10] and the crucial point in this architecture is the anonymity of the C&C servers. However, communication with these servers were still assumed to be through the existing communication infrastructures. Even though Tor could be used as an option [11] , it still exposes the botnet activity due to recognizable patterns [12] . Therefore, strengthening the anonymity further is still needed.
Hence, this paper presents LNBot which is the first botnet that utilizes LN infrastructure for its communications between the botmaster and C&C servers leading to a hybrid architecture. Specifically, a botmaster which is part of the LN will maintain multiple C&C servers which are also nodes on the LN that have specialized software to control the bots assigned to them. Essentially, each C&C server is controlling an independent smaller size botnet. These mini-botnets can be controlled using a specific C&C infrastructure that might rely on the LN itself as well as other traditional ones such as stenography, IRC channel, DNS, Tor, etc. Botmaster will send the commands to the C&C servers covertly through LN. This 2-layer topology not only enables scalability, but also minimizes the burden on each C&C server which will reduce any potential suspicion on them.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the concept, we implemented the LNBot in Bitcoin's Testnet which is the actual network for Bitcoin developers. Initially by assuming a one-tomany architecture (i.e., botmaster sends commands to all C&C servers separately), we show that by encoding the payments sent over LN, one can successfully send commands to the C&C servers that are part of the LN. These C&C servers further relay those commands to the bots they control and these commands can launch any type of attacks to victim machines. Nevertheless, as sending the commands to every C&C server in the form of a payment requires the botmaster to maintain high capacity LN channels (i.e., increased monetary cost), we also propose several mechanisms to minimize this overhead. Specifically, in addition to ASCII-based encoding, we propose a Huffman-coding like encoding mechanism that considers the frequency of characters that could potentially be used in constructing attack commands. This minimizes the total cost of sending a command (e.g. ping).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Previous related work is given in Section II. In Section III, we give some background information about LN, in Section IV we describe the system and threat model, and in Section V we describe the design and construction of our proposed LNBot. Section VI is dedicated to proof-of-concept implementation in real world settings while Section VII presents the evaluation results. In Section VIII, possible countermeasures to stop LNBot are discussed. Finally, we summarize the paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Botnets have been around for a long time and there has been even surveys classifying them [2] [3] . While early botnets used IRC, later botnets focused on P2P C&C for resiliency. Our proposed LNBot can be fall under covert botnets which became popular much later. As an example, Nagaraja et al. proposed Stegobot, a covert botnet using social media networks as communication channel [13] . Some work has been done by Natarajan [19] . Some work has been done to detect covert botnet communication [20] - [22] .
Recent covert botnets started to utilize Blockchain although these are very few. For instance, Roffel et al. [23] came up with the idea of controlling a computer worm using Bitcoin blockchain. Jonathan Sweeny discusses how botnet resiliency can be enhanced using private blockchains [24] . Pirozzi et al. presented their work about the use of blockchain as a command and control center for new generation botnet at EU Cyber Summit [25] . There are also Unblockable Chains [26] , and BOTRACT [27] , which are Ethereum based botnet command and control infrastructures.
Baden et al. [28] proposed a new botnet C&C scheme utilizing Ethereum's Whisper. Even though Whisper as a whole is very hard take down (same as LN), it is still possible to blacklist the topics used by the botmaster. Authors of the paper claims such thing is not practical to do, which we disagree since it is highly unlikely that Ethereum community would let some malicious actors run a botnet on the network which can be easily stopped by blacklisting the used topics.
The closest work to ours is from Taha Ali et al. [9] who propose ZombieCoin, where used Bitcoin transaction spreading mechanism as C&C infrastructure. In their study, the botmaster announces the commands to the bots in terms of legitimate Bitcoin transactions on Bitcoin network. Then, any legitimate Bitcoin nodes that receive these transactions check the correctness of the input address, the digital signature, and in&out Bitcoin amounts of the transaction. After this simple check, the nodes forward the transactions to other nodes. The bots, on the other hand, extract the concealed commands from these transactions. However, this scheme has several drawbacks: First, the authors assumed that the bots identify related transactions from the botmaster's Bitcoin address which enables a possibility to blacklist the botmaster's Bitcoin address. Second, because all transactions are publicly announced, it leaves a public record about the botnet activity. To resolve this problem, in further study they also proposed to employ subliminal channels [8] to cover the botmaster. However, subliminal channels requires a lot of resources to calculate required signatures which is computationally expensive and not practical to use in large scale. Similarly, ChainChannels [29] utilizes Bitcoin to disseminate C&C messages to the bots and these messages remain on the blockchain which is a public record of the botnet activity. In contrast, our work is based on legitimate LN payments. It does not require any additional computation to hide commands. Also these commands are not announced publicly. Finally, different from their architecture, our LNBot is a 2-layer hybrid botnet which provides very high anonymity for the C&C servers and the botmaster.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some background on LN since this is needed to understand the details and challenges of LNBot.
A. Lightning Network
The Lightning Network (LN) concept is introduced in [30] . It includes a layer-2 payment protocol operating on top of Bitcoin. Through this concept, a payment network (referred to as LN) is started among the customers and vendors in 2017 [31] . The aim in creating the LN was to decrease the load on the Bitcoin network, facilitating transactions with affordable fees and reduced transaction validation times, and increasing the scalability of Bitcoin by establishing peer-topeer connections. Despite the big fluctuations in the price of Bitcoin recently, the LN grew exponentially reaching 10,743 nodes and 34,978 channels in less than two years as of the writing of this paper [32] . In the next subsections, we briefly explain the components of LN.
B. Off-chain Concept
The main idea behind LN is to utilize off-chain concept [33] , [34] that enables near instant Bitcoin transactions with negligible fees. This is accomplished through bidirectional payment channels which are created among two parties to exchange funds without committing the transactions to Bitcoin blockchain. Such a channel is opened by making a single on-chain transaction called funding transaction. The opening party of the channel commits some funds into a multisignature address controlled by both parties of the channel. It is not possible for parties to commit more funds into the multisignature address after the funding transaction. In this way, this funding transaction determines the capacity of the channel. The channel can be used as many times as desired by both parties to send payments to each other until the funds in the channel have been exhausted. The example shown in Fig. 1 illustrates this concept in more detail.
Per this figure, Alice opens a channel to Bob with a capacity of 5 Bitcoins and the multisignature address is signed by both Alice and Bob. Using this channel, Alice can send payments to Bob by transferring Bitcoins from multisignature address until the funds in the address are exhausted. Note that these transactions are off-chain meaning they are not written to the Bitcoin blockchain, which is a unique feature of LN that is exploited in our botnet. Alice performs 3 transactions at different times with amounts of 1, 2 and 1 Bitcoin respectively. Eventually, when the channel is closed, remaining 1 Bitcoin on the multisignature wallet is returned to Alice while the total transferred 4 Bitcoins are settled at Bob. Channel closing is also an on-chain transaction that broadcasts latest balances of Alice and Bob on the multisignature address to the blockchain. Note that it is not possible to make a transaction between Alice and Bob exceeding the channel capacity, which is 5 Bitcoins, without depositing more Bitcoins into the multisignature address.
C. Multihop Payments
In LN, a node can send payments to others even though they are not directly connected. This is achieved by utilizing multi-hop transaction forwarding as long as a path of payment channels exists from source to the destination. Fig. 2 briefly depicts the scheme. As there are two direct channels, between Alice and Carol and between Carol and Bob, Alice can forward a transaction to Bob via Carol. In order for Alice to be sure that the money is received by Bob, Alice prepares a payment attached to a secret, H, answer of which is known by Bob. Alice gives ownership of some of her money destined to Bob if and only if Carol knows and discloses the answer to H which is the hash of R. Likewise, Carol gives the ownership of some of her money to Bob if Bob knows and discloses the answer of H. Bob discloses the answer and gets his money. Now, as Carol learned the answer she discloses the answer to Alice and gets her share. This mechanism is realized with the "Hashed Time-Locked Contracts" (HTLC). Through this mechanism of LN, as long as there is a path and channels with enough capacities on the path from a payer to a payee, payments can be routed, just like Internet. 
D. Payment Requests (Invoices)
LN payments are sent using payment requests which are also referred to as invoices. An LN invoice contains all the necessary information for a payer to pay to a payee. In order to facilitate payment, payee prepares an invoice, sends it to the payer. This invoice can be in the format of a QR code for the convenience of the payer. Having the invoice, the payer can then send the payment. Created invoices are stored in a node's local invoice database. For further details on invoices, the readers are referred to the BOLT11 (BOLT: Basis of Lightning Technology) specification which describes data format, required and optional parts, and required behavior of invoices [35] .
E. Sphinx Send
Sphinx is a compact and secure cryptographic packet format that can be used to route messages over a mix network which uses a chain of proxy servers known as mixes taking messages from multiple senders, mixing them and sending them out with a random order to the next destination [36] . Using this mix format, a new payment mode for LN called sphinx send was developed by Lightning Labs [37] in early 2019 [38] . This new mode enables instantaneous payments to a destination without needing to have an invoice first. This is a very useful feature to have in LN because it introduces new use cases where payers can send spontaneous payments without contacting the payee first. In this mode, the sender generates the preimage for a targeted payment instead of the receiver and embeds it into the sphinx packet within the outgoing HTLC. If a remote node accepts sphinx payments, then it only needs to advertise its public key to receive sphinx payments from other nodes. We utilize this feature to send payments from botmaster to C&C servers as will be detailed next.
F. Source & Onion Routing
When multi-hop payment channels are available, routing will be needed to select the best route to reach the destination. LN utilizes source routing which gives nodes full control over the route of their payments within the network. Senders are able to specify: 1) the total number of intermediary nodes (hops) in their routes; 2) total fee they will pay to send the payment; and 3) total time-lock period for the HTLC. Moreover, LN has onion routing capability meaning that intermediate nodes on the route know only their predecessor and successor nodes. Additionally, payment routes are encoded within a mix-net like [36] packet providing the following security and privacy features: 1) Nodes within a route do not know the source and the destination of the payment. 2) Nodes within a route do not know their exact hop position within the route. 3) Nodes within a route do not know the total number of nodes in the payment route. More details about onion routing in LN can be found in [39] , [40] . We note that these features along with LN's decentralized topology are important to provide anonymity as desired by the botnets.
IV. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first describe the overall architecture of the proposed LNBot with its elements and then list the assumed threats in order to expose or detect the C&C servers, C&C communication, IP address/identity of the botmaster.
The overall architecture is shown in Fig. 3 . As shown, the LN is used to maintain the C&C servers and their communication with the botmaster. Each C&C server runs a separate Mini Botnet. Note that these botnets do not need to be under LN and they can follow a different model. It is up to the botmaster how to populate these botnets. Threat 1: Compromising a C&C Server: We assume that the C&C servers could be fully compromised by an adversary. Note that this can also be realized through the bots that could be compromised within mini-botnets and hence give hints about their C&C servers. This attack can make it possible to access to the malware executable, the operating system, memory, logs, etc.
Threat 2: Exposing Botmaster: We assume that an adversary could use any of the above attacks to try to expose the botmaster.
V. DETAILS OF LNBOT

A. Overview
Before we get into the details of how LNBot operates, we first briefly outline its formation, communication, and assumptions.
The botmaster could set up the C&C servers by creating LN nodes at remote locations that are accessible to him/her. The botmaster knows the LN public keys of all C&C servers since s/he set them up. These public keys are needed to communicate with them in the LN. Then s/he installs a special software on the C&C servers which will be used to control the bots. In this way, s/he only needs one malware and releases this malware into the wild for infecting user machines and upon infection, these machines connect to existing available C&C servers (i.e., they become bots). One possible way to achieve this would be to spread the malware via embedded advertisements on web pages frequently visited by intended victims. When a viewer clicks on the link, s/he is redirected to a website hosting malicious code which executes in the background and infects victim's machine without his/her knowledge.
Upon infection, bots establish a communication with the C&C server. The type of connection used depends on the communication method chosen by the C&C servers. This can be LN, Tor, DNS, IRC channel, HTTP etc.
Botmaster's commands have to be propagated into every C&C server from which they are relayed to bots. For this, we propose one-to-many propagation where the botmaster sends commands to each C&C server separately. This approach is described in Section V-E. The botmaster periodically issues commands to C&C servers by making payments over LN. Thus, the commands have to be encoded into a series of LN payments. We implemented two encoding schemes to represent the commands as LN payments. These methods are detailed in Sections V-F1 and V-F2.
With the availability of command propagation, the C&C servers could now listen to the incoming instructions. Next, we describe the details of setting up the C&C servers.
B. Setting up C&C Servers
As mentioned earlier, the botmaster can set up the necessary number of C&C servers s/he would like to deploy. Depending on the objectives, the number of these servers and the number of bots they will control can be adjusted without any scalability concern. In Section VI, we explain how we set up 100 real C&C servers running on LN on Bitcoin Testnet.
Each C&C server has a lightning wallet which needs to be funded with some amount of Bitcoin. This is required for servers to be able to open channels on LN. Botmaster funds the lightning wallets of the C&C servers before deploying them. We utilized at least 3 channels per server so that the botmaster's payments can find a route to any server easily.
C. Formation of Mini-Botnets
After C&C servers are set up, we need bots to establish connections to C&C servers. A machine (bot) infected with our malware will connect to one of the C&C servers available. As mentioned earlier, the details of bot recruitment and implementation issues are beyond the objective of this paper. It is up to botmaster to decide which type of infrastructure the C&C servers will use to control the bots in their possession. This is because it does not matter how C&C servers are controlling the bots since revelation of a C&C server does not reveal the other C&C servers nor the botmaster as discussed in Section VIII.
D. Forming LNBot
Now that C&C servers are set up, the next step is to form the infrastructure to control these C&C servers covertly with minimal chances of getting detected. This is where LN comes into play. Botmaster has the public keys of all LN nodes running on C&C server machines. This means, C&C servers are ready to receive commands from the botmaster. Botmaster uses an LN node called LNBot Master Server to initiate the commands to all the C&C servers through LN payments. Without using any other custom infrastructure, the botmaster is able to control C&C servers through LN consequently controlling all the bots on the botnet.
E. Command Propagation in LNBot
Once the LNBot is formed, the next step is to ensure communication from botmaster to the C&C servers. We utilize a one-to-many architecture where botmaster sends the commands to each C&C server separately. The botmaster uses sphinx send method mentioned in Section III-E to send the payments. In these interactions, the botmaster changes his/her LNBot Master Server regularly. In other words, botmaster creates a new LN node and switches to it from time to time to prevent tracking from any time-based analysis.
We designed a basic connection-oriented protocol for botmaster-to-C&C server communication as shown in Algorithm 1: Send the command to this C&C server at a later time; 18 
end
Before sending any payment, botmaster first checks if the respective C&C server is online or not (LN nodes have to be online in order to send and receive payments). If C&C is not online, command sending is scheduled to a later time. Botmaster sends 5 satoshi 1 as the special starting payment of a command then sends the actual characters in the command one by one. Lastly, sends 6 satoshi as the special ending payment to finish sending the command. If any of these separate payments fail, it is repeated.
The details of encoding and decoding are explained next.
F. Encoding/Decoding Schemes
An important feature of LNBot is its ability to encode botmaster commands into a series of LN payments. We used two different encoding/decoding schemes for the purpose of determining the most efficient way of sending commands to C&C servers in terms of Bitcoin cost and time spent. We explain the details of each method in the subsequent subsections.
1) ASCII Encoding: American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) is a character encoding standard that represents English characters as numbers, assigned from 0 to 127. Numbers 0-31 and 127 are reserved for control characters. The remaining 95 codes from 32 to 126 represent printable characters. Decimal equivalent of ASCII characters can easily be looked up from an ASCII table.
2) Huffman Coding: When there is a need to losslessly compress the information being sent over a channel, due to its simple yet powerful approach, Huffman encoding is one of the optimal options [41] . In usual communication systems, the communication is done in binary domain. However, in the communication scheme defined in our approach, there is no strict need for binary communication. In the formation of the Huffman tree, n−ary number systems can be used. The advantage of n−ary numbering system over binary one is that the messages can be distributed among more compact symbols, hence the required number of transmissions per character will be reduced.
In order to come up with a codebook, a dictionary is needed. The frequencies, so-called probabilities of occurrences, of the characters will shape the size of the codebook. In its most frequently adapted style, users prefer to use bulky novels or texts in order to simulate a more inclusive dictionary.
VI. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we demonstrate that an actual implementation of the proposed LNBot is feasible by presenting a proof of concept.
For development, we used lnd (version 0.6.1-beta) which is one of the implementations of LN developed by Lightning Labs [37] . This is a complete implementation of LN protocol and currently can be used both on Bitcoin Testnet and Mainnet as well as Litecoin Mainnet.
As a proof-of-concept, we built 100 C&C servers on Bitcoin Testnet and assessed certain performance characteristics. We created an anonymous GitHub page explaining the steps to form this botnet. 2 The steps include installation of lnd & bitcoind, configuring lnd and bitcoind, and configuring nodes to use Tor. Note that we run our LN nodes on Tor not to reveal their IP addresses and locations. We plan to keep these 100 nodes running for interested readers to be able to check our nodes' details on LN search and analysis engines such as https://1ml.com/, https://explorer.acinq.co/. Aliases of our testnet nodes start with LNB prefix and appended with the number of the node, as such LNB1, LNB2, ... , LNB100. 3 We are also running 2 nodes on Bitcoin Mainnet.
lnd has an API for communicating with a local lnd instance through gRPC [42] . Using the API, we wrote a client that communicated with lnd in Python. Particularly, we wrote 2 Python scripts, one ran on the C&C servers and one ran on the botmaster machine. We typed the command we wanted to send to C&C servers in a terminal in botmaster machine. The command was processed by the python code and sent to the C&C servers as a series of payments.
VII. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF LNBOT
In this section, we present the cost and time overhead assessment of LNBot.
A. Metrics
To assess the overhead of LNBot, we used the following two metrics:
• Cost: This metric refers to the monetary cost (i.e., in terms of Bitcoin/satoshi) for the setup and operation of LNBot. • Time: This metric measures the messaging, waiting and computational times associated with the setup and operation of LNBot.
B. Overhead Assessment of LNBot Formation
We first analyzed the overhead as a result of forming LNBot. In other words, this is the non-recurring investment overhead for LNBot.
The major cost associated with LNBot formation is mainly due to the need for funding the lightning wallets of the C&C servers that are used for opening channels on LN. lnd has a feature called autopilot which opens channels in an automated manner based on certain initial parameters set in advance [43] . C&C servers employ this functionality of lnd to open channels on LN. In current implementation of lnd, minimum allowable channel capacity is 20,000 satoshi. As noted earlier, we opened 3 channels per server in order to have a good connectivity on LN. Therefore, a server needs 60,000 satoshi for opening these channels. There are also on-chain transaction fees spent for opening these 3 channels. An on-chain transaction fee might be as low as 154 satoshi on Bitcoin Testnet 4 and Bitcoin Mainnet. 5 We neglect the routing fees for multi-hop payments since it is very low. So total cost of opening these channels will be 60,462 satoshi. A channel capacity of 20,000 is sufficient as long as the cost of sending a command to a single server does not exceed 20,000 satoshi. Now, let us calculate the total cost of setting up 100 C&C servers. We already calculated that each server uses only 60,462 satoshi for channel creations. For 100 servers, this cost is equal to 0.060462 Bitcoin (around $400 at current Bitcoin price of $6700). This is a one time non-recurring investment cost of forming LNBot with 100 C&C servers which is a very small amount considering the fact that each C&C server can control tens of thousands of bots.
C. Overhead Assessment of Command Propagation
To assess the command propagation overhead, we performed a SYN flooding attack using the following command (omitting start and end of command characters):
sudo hping3 -i u1 -S -p 80 -c 10 192.168.1.1
We sent this command using both of the encoding methods we proposed earlier. For Huffman coding, we compared several different base number systems. Best result was obtained by using the Quaternary numeral system, codebook of which is shown in Table I . Cost Analysis: Using ASCII encoding, the botmaster spent 2813 satoshi for command propagation. Table II gives details about the number of payments and how many satoshi have been sent in each payment. Since the command was sent to 100 C&C servers, the botmaster spent 100x2813=281,300 satoshi (around $19 at current Bitcoin price of $6700) in total. Maximum channel capacity allowed in lnd is 16, 777, 215 satoshi. Thus, it is enough for the botmaster to have only 1 channel to be able to send (as long as there is a path) a total of 281,300 satoshi to the C&C servers. With Huffman coding, the botmaster spent 215 satoshi which is much less. The details are shown in Table II . Again, with 100 C&C servers, the total satoshi spent by the botmaster is 100x215=21,500 (around $1.5 at current Bitcoin price of $6700). This means a channel capacity of 21,500 satoshi would be enough for SYN flooding attack. Therefore, Huffman coding gives one the ability to perform more attacks without creating high capacity channels.
Time Analysis:
The propagation time of a command is calculated by multiplying the number of payments with the average delivery time of the payments.
To estimate the average delivery time, we sent 90 sphinx payments from botmaster to our C&C servers over LN at random times and measured the time it takes for payments to reach their destinations. The results are depicted in Fig.  4 . As shown, sphinx payments took 7 seconds on average to reach their destinations and the maximum delay was never exceeding 10 seconds. This delay varies since it depends on the path being used and the load of each intermediary node in the LN. We observed that the number of hops for the payments was 4, which provides a good privacy for the transactions. Using average of 7 seconds, the total propagation time for ASCII-coded transactions is 7x44=308 seconds while it is 7x108=756 seconds for Huffman coding. Huffman coding reduces the costs, but increases the communication delays which is not critical in performing the attack.
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we first mention the limitations of LNBot, then discuss possible countermeasures to take it down.
Limitations: It is a challenge for the botmaster to know if a C&C server is compromised or not since the attacker could simply be monitoring the server without shutting it down.
lnd lets the receiver cancel a payment which consequently refunds the amount to the sender. However, this cancellation is possible when the payment is sent using an invoice, and for the time being, cancellation is not possible with sphinx send method due to it still being under development. We have talked to the lnd developers and learned that this feature will be implemented for sphinx send as well. After this feature is added to the sphinx send, the botmaster will not have to pay for any command anymore since C&C servers will simply be able to cancel the payments and refund them back to the botmaster.
Countermeasures: • Taking LN down: Without a doubt, the most effective way to take down LNBot is taking down the LN as a whole which is very unlikely due to LN being a very resilient decentralized payment channel network.
• Compromising a C&C Server: LNBot has a number of C&C servers each of which is controlling a mini botnet using a special software installed on them by the botmaster. As seen many times in the past, even the strongest botnets were taken down by legal authorities and cybersecurity researchers [44] . Therefore, it is highly likely that the mini botnets that are being run by C&C servers will be detected at some point in the future after starting their operations. Detection of a C&C server can result in the revelation of its location/IP address or even further the machine can be physically seized. In the latter case, adversaries would have access to the operating system, memory contents, logs, software etc. In LNBot, seizure of a C&C server does not reveal the botmaster or other C&C servers since a C&C server receive the commands through onion routed payments catered with Sphinx's mix-format which do not reveal their sender. Additionally, the communication between botmaster and C&C servers is 1-way meaning botmaster can talk to servers, but servers cannot talk to botmaster. This 1way communication ensures that the identity of the botmaster will be kept secret at all times. In another scenario, where one of the bots on mini-botnets were detected and possibly seized, this could reveal the identity of the corresponding C&C server. As we explained above, such thing only can be used to shutdown the relevant mini botnet with no effect to the rest of the botnet. Even though taking down the C&C servers neither reveals the botmaster nor stops the botnet as a whole, it shuts down a part of the botnet resulting in less damage to victims.
• Timing Correlation Analysis (Traffic Analysis): Making a correlation-based traffic analysis in the network is proved to be a valid attack mechanism on Tor's anonymity [45] . By capturing or owning majority of the entrance and exit nodes, an analyst can detect the origin of most of the traffic by relating TCP/IP requests and responses to each other. Such an analysis in LN seems valid. However, in LN, definitions for an entrance and exit node do not exist. As explained in Section III-F, intermediary nodes (hops) in a payment path do not know the sender of the payment, therefore they cannot distinguish between the botmaster and a regular forwarding node on the payment path. Therefore, an attacker trying to reveal the LN public keys of the botmaster or C&C servers would create as many LN nodes as possible to increase the likelihood of inclusion of his nodes in the paths of botmaster's payments. In this way, the attacker could analyze the payment forwarding information stored in his nodes by looking at the time stamps of the similar forwarded payments to try to find the source and the destination of the payments. We argue that, unlike in Tor, this attack is not low-cost in LN. Authors of [46] mentions that 1-hop multihop payments hinders privacy of the sender and the receiver. While we agree, in our tests, our payments took 4 hops before they reached to C&C servers which provides the sufficient anonymity to the botmaster and the C&C servers. Even though doing traffic analysis for payments with longer paths (2-hops and more) seems infeasible, we think it is important to discuss it as a possible countermeasure.
• Poisoning Attack: Law enforcement can try to disrupt the C&C communication and such disruption is possible when the public keys of C&C servers are known. An attacker who knows these public keys can send payments to C&C servers to corrupt the messages. The disadvantage of this however is that the attacker has to pay for those payments and s/he will also be financing the botmaster with these payments. This attack can be circumvented by authenticating the messages at the C&C servers. Botmaster can employ such authentication by attaching a signature to payments. Invoice send supports attaching a custom message to a payment, however sphinx send currently does not support it. After the discussions we had with the developers of lnd, we were informed that this feature is a work in progress and will be live in future releases of lnd.
• Analysis of On-chain Payments: Another attack vector to LNBot could be through analyzing the funding transfers of C&C servers (i.e. channel creation transactions). For such a forensic analysis, the Bitcoin addresses of the C&C servers should be known. As with many other real life botnets, botmasters generally use Bitcoin mixers to hide the source of the Bitcoins. Usage of such mixers makes it very hard to follow the real source of the Bitcoins since the transactions are mixed between the users using the mixer service. Even though the chances of finding the identity of the botmaster through this analysis is low, it can provide some useful information to the law enforcement.
IX. CONCLUSION
LN has been formed as a new payment network to address the drawbacks of Bitcoin transactions in terms of time and cost. In addition to anonymity, LN reduce the fees by performing off-chain transactions. This provides a perfect opportunity for covert communications as no transactions are recorded in the blockchain. Therefore, in this paper, we proposed a new covert hybrid botnet by utilizing the LN payment network formed for Bitcoin operations. The idea was to control the C&C servers through messages that are sent in the form of payments through the LN. Furthermore, we designed a novel one-to-many architecture for communication. The proofof-concept implementation of this architecture indicated that LNBot can be successfully created and commands for attacks can be sent to C&C servers through LN with very high anonymity. We have also shown that LNBot is resilient to the attacks assumed in our threat model.
